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NOTES
GIVINGS AND THE NEXT COPYRIGHT
DEFERMENT
Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr.*
In 1998, Congress granted a twenty-year deferment to expiring
copyrights with the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). Ten years later,
debate over the Act's wisdom continues unabated. Major camps in the
debate view the CTEA variously as a constitutional prerogative, an
economic imperative, and a war on cultural freedom. This Note sidesteps
this underlying debate, and, borrowing the property law concept of
"givings, " examines the result of charging for future copyright deferments.
Under this analysis, a givings-based solution would force unproductive
copyrights into the public domain faster and more effectively than current
approaches, while protecting the most important assets of rights-holding
companies likely to influence future legislation.
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA), increasing the period of protection for copyrighted works by
twenty years.' In the decade since that enactment, a no-holds-barred debate
has raged in the courts, academia, and the media over the propriety and the
legality of the Act. Naked hostility and bad blood continue to divide the
CTEA's supporters and opponents. Instead of looking backwards at the
CTEA, however, interested parties should mark this halfway point by
looking to the end of the twenty-year protection period and the inevitable
copyright extension debate to come. This Note weighs the feasibility of
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Abraham Bell for his invaluable guidance and my wife Dana and son Jackson for their love
and support. I would also like to thank Professor Hugh Hansen, Jamela Debelak of Fordham
Law's Center on Law and Information Policy, Sandra Sherman, and Professor Diane
Zimmerman for their timely and crucial observations. Special thanks to Professor Joel
Reidenberg, Professor Pamela Samuelson, and Judge Charles P. Sifion for their inspiration,
as well as to Douglas D. Broadwater and Katherine B. Forrest of Cravath, Swaine & Moore
LLP for introducing me to the practitioner's side of intellectual property. This Note is
dedicated to the memory of my mother, Joan Williams Bowen, and to all of the playwrights
who have shared their "Writings and Discoveries" with The 24 Hour Plays and The Play
Company.
1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
applying the relatively new real property doctrine of "givings" to the next
copyright extension controversy and proposes a givings solution to balance
economic interests of past creators and owners against the interests of future
creators and the public.
The central question in the copyright battle asks how to achieve the dual
purposes of copyright enshrined in the U.S. Constitution: (1) spurring the
creation of new works while (2) ensuring the optimal use of those works
once they have been created.2  In 2003, the petitioners in Eldred v.
Ashcroft3 unsuccessfully argued that the provision of the CTEA that applied
retroactively to creators of preexisting works4 did not advance either of the
constitutional goals of copyright and therefore was unconstitutional. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in Eldred, withheld comment on how well the CTEA
served copyright policy, but held that Congress did not act in excess of its
constitutional powers in enacting it. 5 In doing so, the Court rejected the
petitioners' argument that the Copyright Clause of the Constitution should
be read as a grant to Congress of a narrow and limited power to define
copyrights. 6 The Court also rejected the argument that First Amendment
implications trigger heightened judicial scrutiny of copyright legislation. 7
The arguments of the petitioners and amici curiae in Eldred expressed
some of the warnings of many academics, technologists, and, to a lesser
extent, writers and artists. These warnings go beyond the narrow question
of retroactive extension and describe the impending "enclosure" of the
public domain by overlong copyright terms and other developments of U.S.
copyright law. 8 This enclosure, they say, is the inevitable result of repeated
copyright term extensions that defer the date on which works enter the
public domain. According to the warnings, these successive deferrals could
2. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1484-85 (2007).
3. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (changing the length of copyright protection for works
published after 1978, works created before 1978, or works in the renewal term of copyright
in 1998, rather than just new works).
5. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 220-22.
8. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corporation in Partial Support of Petitioners
at 10, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618) (stressing a link between a steady decrease in the
availability of public domain material and slowing of technical innovation); Brief of Amici
Curiae National Writers Union et al. in Support of Petitioners at 25, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186
(No. 01-618) (describing the "expense, hardship and uncertainty, all of which stifle the
creative process" on new artists who are forced to license underlying works); Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 394-95 (1999) (arguing that media "enclosure" will
foster private censorship); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33,
33-40 (2003) (describing the "first" and "second" enclosures); Peter K. Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 828-40 (2007) (extending the debate
over "the enclosure of the public domain" to international pharmaceutical intellectual
property disputes).
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have the effect of siphoning the fuel from the "engine of free expression"
9
and could have a disastrous effect on our cultural life.10 Such admonitions
have found an avid audience among activists, technologists, and a large
segment of Internet culture, who have formed an extensive anticopyright
movement. 1 1
As a counter to the movement's enthusiasm, the majority of the Court
and some constitutional scholars 12  have sought to prevent other
constitutional concepts from being implicated in the copyright debate.
Scholars in this camp have echoed the Eldred Court, arguing that a proper
understanding of the separation of powers and the original intent of the
Framers permits no more than deferential judicial scrutiny of any statute.
This scrutiny goes no further than ensuring that the statute in question has a
rational relationship to promoting the creation of new works. 13 In other
words, Congress has the power to enact even imperfect (or downright bad)
copyright laws, and to rule otherwise would be a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, implicating areas of policy far beyond copyright.
Both sides in the legal debate can point to compelling interpretations of
the text and structure of the Constitution that support their arguments. 14
However, only one side has the power "to say what the law is"'15 and that
side is not likely to revisit so recent a precedent.
The Court's decision, however, has done little to cool the heated rhetoric
on both sides environment of the copyright term extension (or expiration
deferment 16) debate in the media and scholarly press. 17 Court challenges
9. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
10. Benkler, supra note 8, at 359 ("A world dominated by Disney, News Corp., and
Time Warner appears to be the expected and rational response to excessive enclosure of the
public domain.").
11. See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Creative Commons, Locus ONLINE FEATURES, Nov. 8,
2007, http://www.locusmag.com/Features/2007/ Il/cory-doctorow-creative-commons.html;
David A. Harding, Stallman's Copyright Versus Community Speech 26 March 2007,
GNUISANCE.NET, Apr. 11, 2007, http://gnuisance.net/blog/t/2007/rms-report-2007.html; Eben
Moglen, Talk to the Internet Society, New York Chapter, at Jefferson Markey Library in
Greenwich Village, New York City: Free Software and Free Media (May 3, 2006),
available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FreeSoftware andFreeMedia; see also XKCD:
A Webcomic of Romance, Sarcasm, Math, and Language, http://xkcd.com/343/ (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008) (depicting a hero who learns "about the monstrosity that is U.S. Copyright
law" from Lawrence Lessig and faces down katana-wielding RIAA executives with the help
of activists Richard Stallman and Cory Doctorow).
12. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331,
2334 (2003); see also Craig W. Dallon, Original Intent and the Copyright Clause: Eldred
v. Ashcroft Gets It Right, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 307 (2006).
13. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 187-88; Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2334.
14. Shakespearian clown Launcelot Gobbo faced a similar task in choosing between two
authorities, an imaginary angel and devil, in The Merchant of Venice: "'Conscience,' say I,
'you counsel well;' '[f]iend,' say I, 'you counsel well ... ' WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 2. Gobbo eventually followed the fiend, ignoring any
possible market-based approach to his problem. Id.
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
16. This Note uses the term "deferment" because, as in loan deferment or draft
deferment, it connotes a delay in performance of a duty, rather than a reprieve from a
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have continued post-Eldred as well, notably in Golan v. Gonzales, which
challenged the removal of certain foreign works from the public domain. 18
Likewise, the anticopyright movement has yet to have much effect on
lawmakers. In July 2008, the European Union proposed a forty-five-year
extension to the length of copyright for sound recording performers.'
9
Clearly, the settling of the constitutional power issues raised in Eldred has
not settled the policy question of how the copyright term length should be
calibrated to achieve constitutional copyright goals.
The appellants and amici in Eldred were concerned with protecting the
public domain against what they considered to be Congress's unbalanced
approach to determining the length of copyright. 20 As an alternative to
finding this protection through congressional action or through judicial
restriction of Congress, perhaps the market is a better place to look for a
solution. Market forces may seem a counterintuitive place to look for
balance between private interests and the public good, but the Constitution
provides for just such a mechanism in both the Copyright Clause itself and
in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.21 This Note builds on the
work of Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky 22 in exploring the
looming deadline. Other commonly used terms have been cited as containing value
judgments about the provenance of creativity and the desirability of the public domain. The
most commonly used phrasing of an "extension" that prevents works from "falling into the
public domain" is loaded in the direction of the moral rights of copyright holders. Such an
understanding misses the perspective of the public, which is denied a benefit when the public
domain date is deferred. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain,
28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 256 (2002) (decrying "the commonly used phrase 'fallen into
the public domain' [because] [i]t sounds as if the work has fallen into a black hole, never to
be heard from again"); Chris Sprigman, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the
Copyright Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Mar. 5, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305-sprigman.html ("The linguistic
convention by which works 'fall' when they enter the public domain is revealing: immanent
in the phrase is the notion that a work is debased when no longer copyrighted. Perhaps it is
this view that allows statutes that shrink the public domain to gain widespread support.").
On the other hand, activists who prefer to speak of "freeing" works from copyright also are
loading their language. See Mark Helprin, Op-Ed, A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn't Its
Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at A12 ("'Freeing' a literary work into the public
domain is less a public benefit than a transfer of wealth from the families of American
writers to the executives and stockholders of various businesses .... ").
17. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines:
Intellectual Property and Free Speech in the "Digital Millennium," 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318
(2005) (calling the debate "a culture war of sorts").
18. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Kahle v. Gonzales, 474
F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2007).
19. Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Amending
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Related Rights, at 15-16, COM (2008) 464 final (July 16, 2008)
[hereinafter European Proposal], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=COM:2008:0464:FIN:EN:PDF.
20. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 228 (2004).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
22. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
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possibility that the doctrine of givings, a derivative of Fifth Amendment
takings doctrine, is the most useful and evenhanded approach to the issue of
balancing Congress's power to extend the term of copyrights against the
public's interest in the intellectual property "commons."
Part I of this Note examines the history of copyright deferments from
pre-Revolutionary English law through the debate in the aftermath of
Eldred and Golan. This part also introduces the basics of the theory of
givings in constitutional property jurisprudence, as outlined by Bell and
Parchomovsky. Part II focuses on competing positions regarding future
copyright deferments held by former Eldred and Golan litigants and various
commentators. Part III recommends a givings-based approach to
determining the proper length of protection the next time copyright
expiration is deferred. This part explores how a givings regime in copyright
could address many of the arguments and avoid others in the current
copyright debate. This rough sketch of a givings solution reveals benefits
to both users and owners of copyright. It includes market-imposed
limitations on what material is withheld from the public domain and for
how long it is withheld. This part also addresses possible arguments against
a givings model of copyright expiration deferment.
I. DEFERRING ENTRY OF CREATIVE WORKS INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
This part outlines the goals and history of copyright in the Anglo-
American tradition. It then focuses on the CTEA, Eldred, and the
subsequent debate. Lastly, it introduces the basic concepts of givings.
A. The Balancing Act of Copyright
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Eldred, noted
that the Copyright Clause is a paradox: in order to provide the wider public
with the benefits of an author's work, it forbids anyone but the author from
copying her work. The Court characterized this scheme as an early
example of economic incentives to encourage socially desirable behavior.23
By protecting the works for "limited Times," 24 the Framers ensured that
authors could make money through sales (or assignment of rights) during
that time period, and that they would therefore have an economic incentive
to write rather than pursue what would otherwise be more lucrative
occupations. After that set period, the exclusive rights would expire. The
right to copy and make use of the work would then be generally available,
23. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) ("[C]opyright law serves public
ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones."); see also Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By establishing a
marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 325, 333 (1989) (characterizing the copyright
doctrines of fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy as "attempts to promote economic
efficiency").
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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giving a level of access to the public that would be impossible through the
efforts of even the most diligent bookseller. 25 The American copyright
system thereby harnesses market forces (namely the self-interest of the
author and author's assignees) to promote the public good through private
creation, market dissemination, and finally, public "nationalization" of
creative works.
The difficulty of keeping up with the shifting balance between market
incentives and public access has been the prime mover behind many
revisions of the law since the first Copyright Act of 1790.26 Many of those
successive statutes deferred the expiration of copyright while broadening its
scope.
B. Copyright's History
This section traces domestic and international copyright laws and treaties
from the founding era through the nineteenth century to the CTEA. This
history sheds lights on arguments in favor of and against copyright
deferment.
1. The Constitutional Copyright and Its Forebears
The Constitution creates Congress's power to establish copyright and
patent protection using singular language. Senator Patrick Leahy, speaking
on the Senate floor in 1998, noted, "In the body of the Constitution as
originally ratified, the word 'right' appears only once and that is with regard
to the protection of intellectual property. '27 Specifically, the Copyright
Clause reads, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. '28
James Madison, writing as Publius in the Federalist Papers, asserted the
provision's roots in both English and state law. He predicted that it would
be generally accepted with little controversy, which implied that the new
republic was already part of a copyright tradition.29 In order to see how the
Framers intended to follow that tradition and how they intended to break
25. See LESSIG, supra note 20, at 24-25.
26. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, repealed by Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, repealed by Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat.
1075.
27. 144 CONG REC. S205-06 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
28. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.)
29. "The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy-right of authors [is],
in Great Britain ... a right at common law.... The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals. The states cannot separately make effectual provision for
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of congress." THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison); see also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Infinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L.
REv. 471, 472-73 (2003) (agreeing that "it was English practice that provided the model and
inspiration for the Copyright Clause of the Constitution and for the early federal copyright
statutes").
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from it, it is useful to compare English laws before the Revolution with
American laws just after the framing. 30
Madison apparently was referring 3' to the 1710 English law, the Statute
of Anne. 32 That statute gave authors the right to copy published works,
rather than reinstating the unpopular 150-year-old monopoly of the royally
licensed printers, the Stationers' Company.33 The statute fixed a term of
fourteen years, which was renewable for another fourteen years by a living
author. It included registration requirements and protected some rights of
foreign authors. 3
4
The first Copyright Act in 1790 used the same term length as the Statute
of Anne and added protection for maps and charts, applying the protections
retroactively to works that had already been created. 35 It did not, however,
protect foreign works, which were all in the public domain as far as federal
law was concerned. Madison is on the record in the debates over this bill as
only finding it necessary to give U.S. citizens "encouragement" to create. 36
2. Nineteenth Century Copyright
In the nineteenth century, mainly through case law and the Copyright Act
of 1874, copyright slowly was expanded. This expansion was a response to
the invention of new creative media, mass production, and the
democratization of culture-all of which broadened the audience and
markets for creativity. 3 7 Simultaneously, case law protected the public
30. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 246-47 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
generally Schwartz & Treanor, supra, note 12.
31. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32. See Marc H. Greenberg, Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright's Growing
Pains, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 11 (2007) (calling the Statute of Anne one of
"the first copyright laws in the European tradition," the "principal concern [of which] was
the economic well-being of book publishers"). But see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *406-07 (describing a Roman civil law protecting copyright by securing
rights of artists but not of scribes).
33. The most recent incarnation of the censorship law that reserved exclusive rights to
publish in the Stationer's Company had expired fifteen years before. Paula Baron, The
Moebuis Strip: Private Rights and Public Use in Copyright Law, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1227,
1237-38 (2007). The statute, in part, admonished that "[plinters, booksellers, and other
persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing...
books and other writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and
writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families."
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
34. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). Several states also had common law
copyright, which remain in place for unfixed works only. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-
982 (West 2008).
35. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2387-88. It is worth noting that James
Madison was involved in the debates over the Act and appeared to support its basic aim of
expanding copyright beyond the narrowest of enumerated powers. Id. at 2388.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1908);
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884). These cases were precursors to
modem cases like Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233
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domain by creating and maintaining important curbs on what could be
copyrighted. Chief among these curbs were the idea/expression dichotomy,
which said that only expression and not the ideas behind expression can be
copyrighted, 38 and the fair use doctrine, which protected criticism, parody,
and other transformative, noncompeting uses of protected works. 39
Industry practices also developed to protect libraries, curators, archivists,
and educators. 40
3. The Berne Convention
Partially due to the leadership of Victor Hugo and the efforts of Charles
Dickens, the Berne Convention-the first international copyright
agreement-was signed in 1886.41 Notably, it provided for registration-free
copyright that would be respected in all signatory countries. 42 Works were
protected from the moment they were created and fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.43 This concept came from the French concept of
droit d'auteur, not English copyright law. 44 The Convention, at least in
later iterations, was also retroactive on works that had been in the public
domain in the nonprotecting countries. 45 The United States did not join
Berne for over 100 years. But the International Copyright Act of 1891
expanded U.S. protection to foreign works for the first time, recognizing the
same copyright protections that a work would have had in its country of
origin.46 Even after the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989,
(1996) (per curiam), and Franklin Computer Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 464 U.S. 1033
(1984).
38. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
39. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
40. One example of this was the "Gentlemen's Agreement," which was a forerunner to
the modem doctrine of fair use. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1504-05.
41. Doris Long & Richard Bilder, Recent Books on International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 755, 756 (2002).
42. "[T]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality." Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended on Sept. 29, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
828 U.N.T.S. 221; see also Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 615 n.236 (2005).
43. Hughes, supra note 42, at 615.
44. Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 13-14
(1994) ("In contrast to the utilitarian approach that dominates American copyright doctrine,
Continental jurists have generally been reluctant to see copyright as a sui generis,
instrumentalist construct.").
45. Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States
Copyright Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157, 166
(1996).
46. John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global
Harmonization-and the Need for Congress To Get in Step with a Full Public Performance
Right for Sound Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1074
(2002).
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differences remained between the United States and Europe regarding the
length of terms of the copyrights granted.4 7
More significant differences, however, underlie U.S. and European
copyright law. The U.S. goal of spurring creative output in order to benefit
the public at large is unknown in European law, which, respecting the droit
d'auteur concept, has the protection of the interests of the creators as its
only direct goal.4
8
4. The 1909 Copyright Act
The 1909 Copyright Act extended the copyright term to twenty-eight
years from publication or registration. This term could be renewed for an
additional twenty-eight-year term, upon application to the U.S. Copyright
Office. 49 Therefore, works created in 1881 that would have entered the
public domain in 1909 would have had this expiration deferred until 1937.
The Act did away with the requirement that a work be registered with the
Copyright Office before being protected for the first twenty-eight-year
period.50
Early in the period under the 1909 Act, in 1928, a short cartoon called
Steamboat Willie was released. 51 Ironically, the film itself was a parody
52
47. Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the
Government's Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 91, 177 n.418 (2003) ("Significantly, after joining Berne and enacting the
Berne Convention Implementation Act to comply with its obligations under Berne, the
United States did not adopt a copyright restoration provision." (citing Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2857-58 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.))); see also William Patry, The United States and
International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40 Hous. L. REv. 749, 751-52 (2003);
Dennis S. Karjala, Harmonization Chart Comparing Terms in U.S. and E.U.,
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/Harmonizatio
nChartDSK.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
48. Compare Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant ... copyrights is the conviction that [it] is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors ...."), with Netanel,
supra note 44, at 14 ("[European jurists] have devoted substantial effort and imagination in
the attempt to assimilate copyright within, or at least place it in relation to, the classical
Roman law subdivision of rights: personality rights.., real rights.., and personal
rights ...."). But see Greenberg, supra note 32, at 11 ("[Copyright] now also serves, in the
United States, as the creative persons' equivalent of droit morale.").
49. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075, 1080 (1909) (repealed 1976).
50. Protection was secured instead by publication with a copyright notice, such as the
now-familiar "©" symbol. Id. at 1077-79.
51. STEAMBOAT WILLIE (Walt Disney Productions 1928); see also IMDb: The Internet
Movie Database, Steamboat Willie (1928), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0019422/ (last
visited Oct. 17, 2008).
52. Professor Lawrence Lessig refers to Steamboat Willie as a borrowed "knockoff' of
Buster Keaton's Steamboat Bill, Jr., while other commentators express doubt that it is even a
parody. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 23; Lessig Blog, "It's Simple" Says the MANes,
http://lessig.org/blog/2004/04/its-simplesaysthe-manes.html (April 2, 2004, 20:10 EST).
Contra Stephen Manes, Let's Have Less of Lessig, FORBES.COM, Apr. 2, 2004,
http://www.forbes.com/2004/04/02/cz-sm-0402manes-print.html.
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that would have fallen under the evolving fair use doctrine, and it starred a
character that was a derivative of "Oswald the Rabbit," for which the
cartoonists did not have the rights. 53 The protagonist of this film by Ub
Iwerks and his partner would later become, among other things, a
controversial symbol of the struggles over constitutional interpretation of
the Copyright Clause, congressional power, judicial review, and the
definition of culture in the United States. 54 At the moment, however, it was
just another creative work. Success would transform it into something else
over the next eighty years.
5. The 1976 Copyright Act
The next major revision of the copyright laws extended the copyright
term from a combined fifty-six years to a period equaling the life of the
author plus fifty years, which was the international norm. 55 Corporate
owners of works for hire and anonymous works were given a flat seventy-
five-year term.56 The Act was a reaction to new technologies that impacted
copyrightable audiovisual work and was intended to increase the length of
time exclusive rights in such work could be profitable. 57 Steamboat Willie,
a work for hire, turned forty-eight that year and thus missed passing into the
public domain by eight years. Steamboat Willie's date with the public
domain was deferred until 2003.
The 1976 Act also saw the statutory codification of the fair use doctrine 58
and its four-factor test that determines which noncommercial, educational,
critical, and parody uses of works could be made without prior permission
from a rightsholder.59
53. Jesse Green, Building a Better Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at AR 1.
54. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding
no fair use in underground comics depicting Mickey and his friends in sexual and drug-
related activity); Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2003, at A17; Andrew O'Hehir, Mickey Mouse Is the Devil, SALON.COM, Apr. 16,
2001, http://archive.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/04/16/billy/print.html (chronicling the
crusade of anti-Disney activist and performance artist Bill "Reverend Billy" Talen).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
56. This work for hire provision is now an essential component of the motion picture
and other right-holding industries. However, it seems, at first glance, to be directly contrary
to the text of the Copyright Clause's protection for "Authors." U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
57. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660
("Since [the 1909 Copyright Act] significant changes in technology have affected the
operation of the copyright law."). In 1992, the Copyright Renewal Act removed the
requirement of formally applying for the extension, making renewal automatic for current
rightsholders. Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 265 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
304(a)).
58. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-74, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678-88;
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-77 (1994).
59. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576-77. Notably, one of the four factors in determining fair
use is the existence of harm to any potential market a copyrighted work might have.
Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1495.
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6. The URAA and CTEA
The Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994 (URAA) was the enabling
legislation that codified into law the "Uruguay Round," the portion of the
multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that dealt with
intellectual property.60 In addition to codifying new, tougher penalties for
bootlegging video and audio recordings, 6 1 the URAA accepted the
retroactivity requirements of the Berne Convention, which it had repudiated
even after signing the Convention.62
In 1998, in time for Steamboat Willie's seventieth birthday and five years
before the cartoon's copyright was to expire, Congress passed the
controversial CTEA. 63 The Act deferred the date that Steamboat Willie and
many other iconic works of the early twentieth century were to enter the
public domain by adding twenty years to the 1976 Act's term for natural
authors, for a total of "author's life plus 70 years." 64 Protection of works
for hire was increased to the greater of 120 years after the date of creation
or ninety-five years after first publication.65
Many commentators in the media and academia argued that big
entertainment firms had co-opted the legislature in engineering the
deferment of public domain status for their most valuable works. 66 Less-
cynical observers pointed out that the terms of the CTEA brought U.S. law
in line with international norms.67 Other observers countered, however,
60. 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
61. See id. § 1101; see also Adam Regoli, The Next (and Last?) Constitutional
Copyright Case, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 247 (2007) ("The importance of [Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)] to the United States cannot be
overstated. As the largest producer of intellectual property in the world by far, the United
States has a significant stake in attempting to assure that intellectual property receives
protection around the world." (footnote omitted)).
62. Lee, supra note 47.
63. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
64. Id. § 102(b)(1)-(2). But see Joseph Menn, Disney's Rights to Young Mickey Mouse
May Be Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at 1 (outlining a recently popularized
controversy over copyright formalities that could mean that Steamboat Willie copyrights are
invalid on other grounds).
65. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)(3)(A)-(B), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827.
66. See, e.g., John Kay, Comment: Musicians' Demands for Copyright Extension Are
Off Key, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at 15 ("In 1998, the Disney Corporation persuaded US
Congress to extend the company's exclusive rights to Mickey Mouse and its stable of
cartoon characters.").
67. See 141 CONG. REC. 6550-53 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 141 CONG.
REc. S261 (1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); Marc Shugold, Copyright Fight
Transcends Cat and Mouse, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 5, 2002, at 7D (quoting
Fred Koenigsberg, a lawyer representing copyright holders in Eldred, saying that, "[t]he
European Union is our largest trade partner," and because U.S. copyright would be twemty
years shorter that the E.U.'s without the CTEA, "the money from 20 years of copyright
protection would be lost. That's millions of dollars."); see also Milne ex rel. Coyne v.
Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (granddaughter of A.A. Milne
"motivated by the recent enactment of the CTEA and its favorable treatment of authors'
heirs" suing copyright assignee); Orrin Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright
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that the CTEA actually increased United States-European Union copyright
disharmony. 68 Unlike the international copyright standards, the CTEA
would have to pass a constitutional challenge.
C. Eldred v. Ashcroft
Eldred v. Reno, which reached the Supreme Court as Eldred v. Asheroft,
was the major constitutional challenge to the CTEA. The petitioners' basic
argument was that the statute violated the text of the Copyright Clause
(specifically the preamble and the Limited Times Clause) with its
retroactive application to existing works.69 The petitioners put great weight
on their interpretations of the Founders' original intent as to the limitations
of congressional power in its brief.70 Secondary arguments involved the
First Amendment and public trust doctrine. 71
Then-Judge Ginsburg, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Eldred v. Reno, already had found for the
government and upheld the CTEA.72  Eric Eldred appealed and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Because the Court had decided eight
years before, in United States v. Lopez, that Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause could be limited by the Court,73 the petitioners felt
confident that their constitutional argument would carry the day. 74 On
appeal, however, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, upheld her own
D.C. Circuit opinion, over dissents by Justices Stephen Breyer and John
Paul Stevens. 75
Stanford Law School professor Lawrence Lessig, representing the
petitioner, Eldred, argued that the CTEA needed to be scrutinized with a
higher standard than rational basis review, and that retroactive deferments
were not sufficiently related to the goals in the preamble to the Copyright
Clause. 76 According to Professor Lessig's formulation, the grant of power
in the Copyright Clause is narrow and carefully enumerated. 77 That grant is
narrowed again by the preamble, whose strong implication is that the
enumerated power may only be used to pass copyright laws that directly
"promote the progress of Science and useful Arts."' 78 According to Lessig,
Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium, 59 U. Pirr L. REv. 719, 732-34 (1998) ("Among
the primary justifications [for the] life-plus-70 term ... was the conclusion that the life-plus-
50 term is no longer sufficient to protect two generations of an author's heirs."); Shugold,
supra (giving further justification for the extension as providing greater protections for
authors "plus two generations, so that (an] author's grandchildren could realize royalties").
68. Karjala, supra note 47.
69. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
70. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2364.
71. Id. at 2333 n.11, 2348.
72. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
73. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
74. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 219-20 (discussing Eldred v. Ashcroft).
75. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
76. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2390-91.
77. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 2-7, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-168).
78. See id. at 10-12.
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since the works in question were already created, protecting them was not
promoting the creation of new works.79
Additionally, Eldred argued, in allowing a private removal of works that
would otherwise have inevitably fallen into the public domain, Congress
had limited his ability to make speech containing those works. Even though
a copyright suit was between private parties and not a direct restriction from
Congress, he would have been able to make such speeches without
interference or permission if the CTEA had not been passed.80
An amicus curiae brief filed in support of Eldred by several economists
and legal scholars of "public choice theory" 8 1 made a policy argument
based on an economic analysis. This analysis contended that a longer term
of copyright provided a small incentive for creative output that was
outweighed by the social costs of a longer copyright monopoly. 82
According to Lessig,8 3 the economists concluded that in passing the CTEA,
Congress responded to the "rent-seeking" 84 desires of a small, politically
powerful group of copyright holders and enacted legislation that provides
less of an incentive to the creation of new works than it harms society by
allowing copyright holders to charge artificially high prices and by
restraining the creation of new works based on copyrighted material.8 5
The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, held that the clause's
preamble was not meant to be a set of guidelines with which the Court
could bind Congress. The Court further held that retroactive deferment of
existing copyrights had been part of every American copyright act. 86 The
opinion did not directly address the First Amendment implications of the
79. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2345-46 (summarizing Eldred's
argument that "for all retroactive extensions, it makes no economic sense to create an
incentive for work that has already been produced" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. See id. at 2333 n.11, 2348.
81. Such scholars included George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F.
Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald H. Coase, Linda R. Cohen, and Milton Friedman.
See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at IA,
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618); LESSIG, supra note 20, at 232.
82. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 81, at 1-3.
83. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 232; see also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 81, at 11-12.
84. According to Robert Cooter, "'rent' refers to profits from passive ownership, as
opposed to profits from productive activity." ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC
CONSTITUTION 116 (1999), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1039&context-robertcooter. "Rent-seeking," in public choice theory, exists when
an interested minority out-organizes more diffuse groups in order to influence legislation that
benefits them. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 15 n.10 (1991). This behavior is often termed rent-seeking when
the harm to society at large is greater than the benefits bestowed on the interested minority.
Id. at 34. The means by which influence is brought to bear is generally political lobbying
and electoral support for individual politicians whose self-interest in being re-elected makes
them unreliable stewards of the public good. Id. at 20, 22 & n.45.
85. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 81, at 5-8, 10-11, 14-15; see also Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2348.
86. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204, 212-13.
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CTEA, because the law had not changed "the traditional contours of
copyright" protection. 87  The dissent adopted, to varying extents, the
arguments of Eldred and the amici curiae.88
The majority held that when Congress sets any fixed term, it abides by
the plain language of the "limited Times" prohibition of the Copyright
Clause.89 The preamble is not, according to the Court, a limitation on the
power of Congress to set the term however it believes will best reach the
Constitution's goals. The Court said that "[n]othing before [it] warrant[ed]
construction of the CTEA's 20-year term extension as a congressional
attempt to evade or override the 'limited Times' constraint." 90
Rather than finding a self-limiting constitutional grant of power to
Congress, the majority found that copyright legislation need only meet
rational basis review. 91  As precedent, the Court held that the first
Copyright Act of 1790 also applied copyright to preexisting and future
works.92 The majority also cited prior Copyright Acts from 1831 through
1976, holding that they extended the copyright term for both future and
existing works as a matter of fair and equitable treatment of different
creators. 93 The Court held that Eldred had failed to show why the term
extensions in CTEA, and not in earlier acts, violated the Constitution.94
As described above, the Eldred Court did not find that the CTEA, in
deferring the entry of certain extant copyrighted works into the public
domain, changed the "traditional contours of copyright protection," and so
therefore the First Amendment was not implicated.95
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, focused on the fact that most works of
fiction fail to become classics or reap rewards more than fifty years after the
author's death. 96 According to Breyer, this shows that monetary reward is
not what motivates artists.97 Breyer cast doubt on the possibility that the
present value of the copyright extension will have much impact on a living
87. Id. at 221, 264.
88. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2350; see, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. 249-52,
255 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199.
90. Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 204.
92. Id. at 200.
93. The Court went on to say,
Congress' consistent historical practice of applying newly enacted copyright terms
to future and existing copyrights reflects a judgment stated concisely by
Representative Huntington at the time of the 1831 Act: "[Jiustice, policy, and
equity alike forb[id]" that an "author who had sold his [work] a week ago, be
placed in a worse situation than the author who should sell his work the day after
the passing of [the] act." The CTEA follows this historical practice by keeping the
duration provisions of the 1976 Act largely in place and simply adding 20 years to
each of them.
Id. at 204 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 199.
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id. at 254-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
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author or that "somehow, somewhere, some potential author might be
moved by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving copyright royalties a
century hence." 98
Justice Stevens analogized to terms of protection in patent law in his
dissent. He argued that not only would it be unfair to shorten the term of
patents, but also that Congress did not have the ability to do so. 99
Therefore, under the quid pro quo theory that the grant of copyright as a
contract whose consideration is the public domain rights after a set term of
years, it would be just as unfair for the public to have its contractual rights
as "owners" of the public domain violated by the CTEA. 100
After the loss in Eldred, Lessig mounted a similar attack on another
copyright statute. In Kahle v. Gonzales, Lessig argued that the changes in
the 1992 Copyright Renewal Act had First Amendment implications
because the changes limited people from using works whose copyright had
not properly been renewed according to the laws in force at the time. 10 1
The petitioners argued that the change from the opt-in system of registration
to the opt-out system of registrationless copyright was a change in the
"traditional contours of copyright" and should have been subject to First
Amendment strict scrutiny. 10 2 Writing for the majority, Judge Joseph
Jerome Farris characterized this as "essentially the same argument, in
different form, that the Supreme Court rejected in Eldred. It fails here as
well." 103
Golan, however, fared better in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit with similar claims about the URAA's retroactivity and removal of
works from the public domain altering the traditional contours of free
speech and implicating the First Amendment. 104 The gist of the argument
was that copyright, in protecting works that had already entered into the
public domain (as in the case of the URAA), implicates First Amendment
speech rights and triggers strict judicial scrutiny.10 5 The U.S. District Court
98. Id. at 255.
99. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a
patent, the Government as a representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by
shortening the term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the invention. The
fairness considerations that underlie the constitutional protections against ex post facto laws
and laws impairing the obligation of contracts would presumably disable Congress from
making such a retroactive change in the public's bargain with an inventor without providing
compensation for the taking."). But see Symposium, Panel II: Mickey Mice? Potential
Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 784
(2003) [hereinafter Symposium, Mickey Mice?] (statement of Eben Moglen, Professor,
Columbia University Law School, assuming that Congress could have chosen to shorten the
length of copyright).
100. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2007).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 668.
104. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192-96 (10th Cir. 2007).
105. Id. at 1183-84.
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for the District of Colorado had dismissed Golan's claims that the URAA
violated the First Amendment by restricting speech. 106
The district court's opinion stated that the fact that the petitioner was
constrained to contract for rights to copyrighted works did not affect First
Amendment rights. 10 7 The Tenth Circuit, however, remanded the First
Amendment questions, holding that by removing works from the public
domain (which the CTEA had not done), the URAA changed the
"traditional copyright contours" mentioned in Eldred.10 8  The court
reasoned that copyrighting a work that already had become part of the
public domain was a significant alteration to the normally one-way passage
into the public domain and therefore changed the contours of the system. 109
The court instructed the district court to apply strict scrutiny to the First
Amendment concerns on remand. I10 Factoring into the court's analysis was
the fact that the petitioners included small nonprofit symphonies and music
librarians. '''
D. Eldred's Aftermath
This section summarizes various responses to the Eldred decision,
including responses from opponents of the CTEA, professors concerned
with the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and the entertainment
industry. This section also sketches a brief outline of law and economics
scholarship regarding copyright extension.
1. The IP Restrictors / Free Culture Movement
Professor Paul M. Schwartz and Dean William Michael Treanor refer to
critics of copyright extension as "IP Restrictors,"1 12 while Professor Lessig
prefers to frame the debate as implicating a right similar to free speech that
he calls "free culture." 13  However, Schwartz and Treanor's term has
merit, as the movement's view, with a few exceptions, 114 is that copyright
is a necessary evil (at best) and as such should be carefully limited. 115
106. Id. at 1182-83.
107. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL 914754, at *16-17 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005).
108. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1192-96.
109. Id. at 1189.
110. Id. at 1196.
111. See id. at 1193. The dissent in Eldred made it clear that the free speech rights that
the Court considered and denied in Eldred included "music fees that may prevent youth or
community orchestras, or church choirs, from performing early 20th-century music." Eldred,
537 U.S. at 251 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2332; see also Greenberg, supra, note 32, at 4
(characterizing the term as "probably accurate" but "a bit incendiary").
113. See generally LESSIG, supra note 20. As Professor Lessig writes, he uses "free
culture" in the sense of "free speech" and "free market" rather than "free beer" (as
irresistible as the latter connotation may be). Id. at xiv.
114. See supra Part II.A.
115. Boyle, supra note 8, at 54; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's
Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REv. 217, 248-49 (1998) (referring
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Furthermore, they read the Constitution, even post-Eldred, as restricting the
powers of Congress to pass laws that defer copyright expiration. 116 Based
on that reading, they argue that courts should strike down laws like the
CTEA, both as a policy matter and as a violation of the Constitution's
restrictions on Congress.
"Free culture" is predicated on the idea that, in order to engage in the
exchange of ideas that free speech allows, people must be able to share
those ideas without first asking permission to communicate them even if the
vessel for those ideas happens to be in someone else's words. 1 7 In a world,
Professor Lessig argues, of possibly infinite deferments of copyright
expiration and a stagnant public domain, more and more of our cultural
landscape is owned by corporations. 1 18 Thus, there is less room for free
transmission of ideas through shared culture, apart from the commodified
pabulum of corporate entertainment and media.119
The public domain, "owned" in common by all citizens and held in trust
by the government, is essential to this idea of free culture. 120 Many judges
and scholars agree that all writers and artists build on the works of others to
some extent, and that this is a permissible appropriation of ideas and
expressions from the public domain. 12 1 Even some scholarly advocates of
strong intellectual property rights think of the public domain as the default
state of all ideas and expressions of those ideas. 122 As a reward for their
labors, creators are permitted to have the exclusive right to disseminate and
license the use of their expression of public domain ideas for a limited time,
after which the expressions return to the public ownership. 123
The IP Restrictors argue that when too many iterations of ideas are
fenced off for long periods, or perhaps for good, there will be less raw
material for later artists to use. 124 The less raw material that exists in the
to copyright as a "necessary evil"); Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law
Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 785, 789 (2004) (positing that copyright may hinder the goal of spurring creativity).
116. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 243-44.
117. Benkler, supra note 8, at 358.
118. See LESSIG, supra note 20, at 243-44.
119. Lessig points out that today's mass media (film, radio, cable television, and the
recording industry) is the product of willful infringement, legitimized by Congress. Id.; see
also Nadel, supra note 115, at 790 (arguing that copyright encourages low-quality
"blockbuster" entertainment at the expense of more artistic endeavors).
120. There are numerous examples of government (beginning with the Founders) using
similar mechanisms to hold property in trust for the citizenry, sometimes charging a usage
fee to private citizens, including the Land Grants, and the beds of navigable rivers. See
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); see also Boyle, supra note 8, at 59.
121. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 332; see also LESSIG, supra note 20, at
83 (refusing to recognize a difference between the ownership of ideas and expressions).
122. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1771 (2007).
123. See id.
124. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curae in Support of Petitioners, supra
note 81, at 12-15.
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public domain, the fewer new works can be created from it. 125 Thus, the
enclosure of the public's former marketplace of ideas results in an
intellectual starving of the community. 126
Like most observers of American copyright law, the IP Restrictors
characterize the purpose of copyright laws as utilitarian in nature: the
property rights or privileges in copyright are meant to enrich the public and
expose them to new knowledge, not to protect the natural rights of
creators. 127 Eldred invoked those aims in his argument before the D.C.
Circuit and Supreme Court that protection for existing works could not, ex
post, add new knowledge to society.' 28
Lessig argued that the CTEA acts inefficiently to harm potential users
without benefiting many rightsholders because "it grants copyright
protection regardless of the copyright holder's preferences."' 129 Some of
these works, called "orphaned works," have no traceable rightsholders at
all. Orphaned works are still under copyright, but are out of print or
similarly unexploited. The creator may be dead, and his or her heirs may
have no idea that they own the rights. 130 The dilemma of orphaned works
was one of the main issues of Kahle131 and has also been an important
component to the arguments in the lawsuits and scholarly debates involving
Google Book Search. 132
Professor Reza Dibadj argues that too much copyright protection creates
an anticommons. In this anticommons, orphaned works-type underuse is
encouraged, since many rightsholders have the ability to exclude everyone
without the incentive to develop property interests in the work.133
Public choice theory, which examines the role of the legislature's self-
interest in the lawmaking process, 34 has also played a role in the criticism
125. This idea is not unique to the Free Culture movement. See generally Landes &
Posner, supra note 23.
126. See generally Boyle, supra note 8.
127. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(characterizing copyright as "the engine of free expression"); supra notes 44, 48.
128. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
129. Matthew Dean Stratton, Note, Will Lessig Succeed in Challenging the CTEA, Post-
Eldred?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 893, 916 (2005). As a partial
solution to the problem of rightsholders not being able to easily voluntarily disclaim
copyright protections when they are unwanted, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Professor
Lessig's Creative Commons organization have provided creators with more convenient
licenses to allow public domain-like use of otherwise protected works. See generally
Creative Commons, About, http://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
130. MARYBETH PETERS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
131. Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665, 666-67 (9th Cir. 2007).
132. McGraw Hill Cos. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 19, 2005);
Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2005). For more
discussion of orphaned works, see supra Parts II.C. 1, III.B.
133. Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041,
1047-51 (2003).
134. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 321 (2004).
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of the Court's decision to uphold the CTEA. Critics claim that Congress
has been captured by the extensive political donations from wealthy rights-
holding industries, especially Disney, the corporate owner of Steamboat
Willie and the character it spawned, Mickey Mouse. 135 Professor Lessig
characterizes the rights-holding industry's influence as "corruption": 136
Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the Act in the House received the
maximum contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the
Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received contributions. The
[Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)] and the [Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA)] . . .paid out more than
$200,000 in campaign contributions. Disney is estimated to have
contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the 1998
cycle. 1
3 7
Other commentators have been more blunt, characterizing the pro-CTEA
parties as "a purchased Congress [with] a piece of corrupt hireling
legislation, a bought bar, and a co-opted academic circle of
commentators." 38 So seriously does Lessig take this issue, that in July of
2007, he announced that he was stepping down from the copyright debate,
per se, in order to concentrate on the problem of lobbyists' undue influence
over legislation. 139
2. Originalist Eldred Commentary
Professor Schwartz and Dean Treanor, in their article defending the result
in Eldred on constitutional separation of powers issues, worried that the
jurisprudential underpinnings of the Eldred opinion might not hold up to
repeated assault, because the opinion did not address Eldred's originalist
claims as thoroughly as it could have done. 140 They added that each
Copyright Act, starting with that of 1789, enlarged the scope of what could
be protected to include such items as maps and visual arts. 14 1 According to
Schwartz and Treanor, this shows that a narrow reading of an enumerated
135. See generally Green, supra note 53.
136. See LESSIG, supra note 20, at 216 ("[Tjhe practice [of extending copyright
protection] had become... lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners
will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going. [This is] '[c]orruption' not in the
sense that representatives are bribed. Rather, 'corruption' in the sense that the system
induces the beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it
to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why not limit its
actions to those things it must do-and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms
pays.").
137. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
138. Symposium, Mickey Mice?, supra note 99, at 784 (Professor Moglen, commenting).
139. Noam Cohen, Taking the Copyright Fight Into a New Arena, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2007, at C3.
140. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2350-53, 2369.
141. See id. at 2387.
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right to protect "writings" and "inventions" was not what the Founders had
in mind. 142
Central to the reading of the constitutional text in Eldred's appeal was the
idea that the Founders were hostile to all forms of monopoly interest, which
they considered copyright to be. 143 Justice Breyer, in dissent, also implied
that the Founders only allowed for copyright grudgingly and with a very
narrow scope. 144 Therefore, when in doubt, original understanding should
be read in favor of strong limits on Congress's power to grant copyrights.
Schwartz and Treanor pointed out, however, that the Founder's attitudes
toward monopolies were anything but monolithic. 145 The Federalists in
particular were in favor of creating monopolies for banking, infrastructure
projects, and transportation. 146 Republican Madison, who was suspicious
of monopolies, also wrote of the utility of harnessing the economic
incentive of monopoly to encourage creators. 14 7
Schwartz and Treanor's main objection to Lessig's arguments in Eldred
is that the judicial restraint on what is basically an economic decision
smacks of the activist court days of Lochner v. New York. 148 Because much
of the jurisprudence of the last century has been based on a repudiation of
Lochner and the attempts of the Court of that era to interfere with
congressional economic legislation, constitutional scholars and the Court
are not likely to favor an encroachment in this area.1 4 9 Furthermore, the
jurisprudence that ended the era of Lochner was firmly rooted in the
Founders' conception of judicial deference to Congress in economic
matters. 150
142. Id.
143. See Brief for Petitioners at 23-25, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
168); Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2383.
144. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 246-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2383-84.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2384 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1790, at 562, 566 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995)).
148. Id. at 2334 (referring to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
149. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2359-61, 2400, 2411 (describing the
jurisprudential aftermath of Lochner and positing that a decision for Eldred might not
endure). It is also worth noting that the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), a precedent that Professor Lessig thought would be determinative in Eldred,
involved a federalism argument that was not implicated in Eldred. Rather than asserting the
inability of Congress to pass a certain kind of law, Lopez stood for the proposition that the
individual states, and not the federal government, properly held that power. See James E.
Fleming, The New Constitutional Order and the Heartening of Conservative Constitutional
Aspirations, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 537 (2006) (arguing that Lopez "really just sent a
message to Congress that there is no general federal police power" rather than signaled a
revolution in the Court's jurisprudence); Symposium, Panel III. United States v.
Martignon-Case in Controversy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223, 1270
(2006) (statement by Hugh Hanson, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law,
pointing out that "[t]he real issue has been the respective legislative roles of Congress and
the states," and that federalism concerns are inapposite to intellectual property legislation).
150. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2367-68.
[Vol. 77
2008] GIVINGS AND THE NEXT COPYRIGHT DEFERMENT 829
3. Copyright Warriors-Industry Responses
The most economically powerful rights-holding industries, known to
Professor Lessig as "Copyright Warriors" and to themselves as defenders of
"creative property," were understandably supportive of the decision in
Eldred.15 1 Cary Sherman, copyright attorney and president of the RIAA,
approvingly noted that the "Court has affirmed . . . the authority of
Congress to adapt [the copyright system] in response to evolving markets
and international developments. The Court also recognized, once again,
that copyright and the First Amendment are completely compatible."' 52
Jack Valenti, president of the MPAA, characterized Eldred as a "victory not
solely for rights holders but also for consumers everywhere."' 153 House
Judiciary Committee chairman F. James Sensenbrenner said, in support of
the decision,
The United States produces more intellectual property than any other
country in the world. The copyright and related industries employ
millions of American workers, and its vitality is critical to our national
economy. The Court's decision will ensure that American copyright
holders will generate additional revenues from domestic and foreign sales
of their copyrighted works. 154
Such statements are representative of a focus on economic activity as an
end, rather than a means, of copyright.
According to the Copyright Warriors, the current copyright system may
be as inefficiently underprotective of some rights as well as creating
wasteful industry practices. Certainly the pre-1989 practice of European
publishers requiring American editions of books to be released
simultaneously with Canadian editions in order to take advantage of more
protective U.K. copyright laws was a wasteful method that ensured that the
URAA copyright terms would effectively apply no matter what the state of
U.S. law was at the time.
Dissemination of some works may also be better served by a single entity
stewarding the process than by widely available, perhaps poor quality,
copies flooding the market in a short period of time:
There is no one who will invest the funds for enhancement because
there is no longer an incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that
anyone can offer for sale. A public domain work is an orphan. No one is
responsible for its life. But everyone exploits its use, until that time
certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous
virtues. 155
151. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 18, 79.
152. Richard Koman, Eldred Opinion Met with Anger, Determination, O'REILLY POLICY
DEVCENTER, Jan. 16, 2003, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2003/01/16/Eldred.html.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 42 (1997) (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
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If this claim, made by Valenti in 1995, is true, there is little reason why it
would not apply seventy years after the death of the creator just as much as
at any other time. 156
Another concern of rightsholders in the digital age is the opposite of the
threat from poor quality copies: the ease with which perfect digital copies
can be made and disseminated. With so much more illegal infringement
reducing the incentives for creators, investors, and developers of creative
works, the industry argues, those incentives should be enhanced by greater
protection against competition from commercial public domain users.
4. Positioning Deferments Within the Overall Economic
Scheme of Copyright
Copyright can be examined from a purely economic standpoint, as much
of the scholarly literature on copyright shows. Law and economics scholars
characterize the creative works market as necessarily imperfect. 157 In an
efficient market, the market "clears" when supply and demand meet
perfectly,15 8 however the creative works market will never clear on its own,
because creative works are a "public good."'159 A public good is expensive
to create initially, yet very cheap to reproduce. 160 Thus, if there were no
laws that protected copyright, there would be no market at all, since there
would be no incentive to spend money and time creating works that other
people could exactly reproduce and sell very cheaply. 161  Copyright,
therefore, in creating limited monopolies, is intended to do what the market
alone is unable to do: strengthen the position of creators enough by giving
them the ability to set prices on the market, rather than letting copying and
distribution costs set prices.
Copyright expiration deferments are also capable of market evaluation.
Notwithstanding the constitutional arguments of their lawyers and the
cultural concerns of other IP Restrictors, the real goals of the parties at bar
Motion Picture Association of America). But see Green, supra note 53 (reporting artists and
media figures' assessments that Mickey Mouse has become a "deracinated" character
through Disney's failure to reimagine what has become its corporate logo).
156. Philip Glass and several classical composers took a similarly long view in an amicus
brief in Eldred. They argued that, in their genre, sixty years to reach public acceptance is not
such an unusual wait. Brief of Symphonic and Concert Composers Jack Beeson et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10-12, Eldred V. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. 01-618). Echoing testimony given to Congress during hearings on the CTEA, the
composers added that after a long and productive career, they should be able to provide for
their children and grandchildren in the same manner as successful people in other areas. Id.
at 15-16; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207-08 n.15 (recounting congressional testimony of
Bob Dylan and Quincy Jones).
157. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283,293 (1996).
158. Keith Sharfman, The Law and Economics of Hoarding, 19 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV.
179, 189-90 (2007).
159. See Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 326.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 328.
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in Eldred and Golan were economic. The website operators, DVD
packagers, and music librarians in those cases had standing because the
laws affected their livelihoods, not their sense of how judicial review
should operate. Seen through this economic prism, the petitioners were
concerned with copyright as a method of delineating property and allocating
resources. 162 Their business plans to use their expected legal privileges in
public domain works were scuttled when those privileges never came into
being when copyright owners' rights to keep them from using the works in
question were extended. 163
Professor Henry Smith, borrowing a concept from property law, applies
the ancient property law doctrine of accession to explain copyright. 164
Accession governs when the good faith (but mistaken) expropriation of
another's property leads to improvements that cannot be separated from the
original item. 165  In such cases, the improver owes a payment to
compensate for the original trespass, but has a right to keep the improved
item. 166 Professor Smith's accession theory of copyright contends that the
accession model reimburses writers as the improvers of public domain ideas
(owned by the public) for their inputs into the work while "paying" the
ideas' original owners, the public, for works taken from the public
domain.' 6 7 This payment is the return of the right to copy and use to the
public domain after a term of years. 168 Under this conception, every time
that reversion is deferred, the value of the "payment" to the public
decreases. 169 To borrow the terms used in the Eldred briefs, the "quid pro
quo" under which rightsholders were granted copyrights was not honored.
The petitioners, therefore, as members of the public, lost the bargained-for
exchange outlined in both the Constitution and prior copyright laws. 170
Whether the major rights-holding industries or Congress intend to create
a perpetual property right in copyright or not, there is nothing in the Eldred
opinion, as Lessig points out, stopping a de facto perpetual copyright from
being created, by "moving the goalposts" every time valuable copyrights
are in danger of entering the public domain.'17 While several arguments,
162. For an illustration of this concept of the purpose of copyright, see Smith, supra note
122, at 1745-48.
163. The classic explanation of the terms "rights" and "privileges" can be found in
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
164. Smith, supra note 122, at 1766, 1772-73.
165. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (8th ed. 2004); Smith, supra note 122, at 1772-73.
166. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 4 (8th ed. 2004); Smith, supra note 122, at 1766,
1772-73.
167. Smith, supra note 122, at 1766, 1772-73.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2343. This argument did not convince
the Court, which saw any deferment granted as part of the copyright holders' bargained-for
exchange, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003), but it nonetheless illustrates
petitioner's economic point.
171. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 215-16.
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including the need for international harmonization, were persuasive in
Eldred, none of them were essential to its decision, which required only that
Congress have a rational basis for the deferments. 172 Therefore, the public
domain is left open for future enclosure, even if predictions about the
effects of the CTEA itself do not come to fruition.
The potential effect of perpetual deferment on public access to works is
obvious: intellectual property owners would be strongly favored over the
general public, who would have to pay to use the kind of material that had
once been free. Subtler, perhaps, is the potential negative effect on the
creation of new works. As Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor William
M. Landes point out, this overprotection of copyright would paradoxically
lead to the underproduction of new creative works that typically build upon
older works. 173
This underproduction would be exacerbated by the fact that, as enduring
works age, their value both to the public and to future creators increases
tremendously. 174 Mickey Mouse and Scarlet O'Hara have more power as
symbols than Pixar's Wall-E 175 or Elle Woods from Legally Blonde.176
Therefore, keeping these works out of the public domain has a more
pronounced effect than the denial of economic advantages to potential
commercial users of the public domain.
The modem problem of orphaned works has been much discussed as a
market failure. In 2006, the Copyright Office released a compendium of
over 850 written comments on its "Report on Orphan Works," an
outpouring of public response it termed "extraordinary."' 177 Jason Schultz
compiled research on behalf of the Eldred legal team showing the
percentage of works that were orphaned. 178 He found that "of the 187,280
books published in the U.S. from 1927-1946, only [2.3%, or] 4,267 [were]
available in 2002 from publishers at any price." Only 9.2% of films were
available. 179
Several fairly recent copyright developments have coincided to
compound the orphaned works problem. The removal of any registration
requirement, automatic extension, and terms that outlast a typical single
lifespan are chief among them. 180 Also, the addition of statutory damages
172. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 189.
173. Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 332.
174. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 251 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The older the work, the more
likely it will prove useful to the historian, artist, or teacher."). Professor Joseph Liu makes a
similar point in the fair use context, saying that "fair use should be greater for Mickey
Mouse than for Harry Potter." Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 409, 410 (2002) (citations omitted).
175. WALL-E (Pixar Animation Studios 2008).
176. LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001).
177. Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch & Sen.
Patrick Leahy (Jan. 23, 2006), in PETERS, supra note 130.
178. Jason Schultz, The Myth of the 1976 Copyright "Chaos" Theory, available at
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/j asonfinal.pdf.
179. Id. at 2.
180. PETERS, supra note 130, at 3.
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that can hold an infringer responsible for sums greatly outweighing the
market value of their use of the copyrighted work create some incentive for
heirs to maintain an interest in even relatively valueless copyrights. 181 It is
easy to see that the potential of continued deferral of public domain status
can have a chilling effect on industries or future creators by creating
considerable uncertainty as to whether certain classes of works will become
part of the public domain in time to be utilized by any one user.1 82 This
leads to underinvestment in otherwise promising areas of commerce and
creative realms that seek to utilize the public domain in exactly the way that
scholars, Congress, and the Courts agree it is meant to be used.
There are options for potential rights users to legally use copyrighted
works, but these options are quite limited, and have been curtailed further
by recent copyright statutes. First, users of copyrighted works can license
the works. Supposing that the rightsholders can be reached, the cost of
licensing, controlled by contract law, can be "prohibitive."'183  In an
undistorted market, a high cost is no sin at all, but the current system
encourages holdouts, strategic bargaining for less valuable properties, and
overzealous litigation for more valuable ones. A socially wasteful example
of the holdout problem is the well-known civil rights era documentary,
"Eyes on the Prize," which currently cannot be shown legally. 184 The
licenses for some film clips that originally were properly obtained for use in
the film have expired, and the fee for extended licenses demanded by a
minority of rightsholders are so high as to make the enterprise
unprofitable. 185
The second option is to wait to be sued for infringement and roll the dice
on fair use. The most prominent recent example of this is the Google Book
Search controversy. As legal and business commentators have pointed out,
Google is taking a serious risk with this strategy. 186 The fair use exception,
as an ex ante doctrine, is subject to the same uncertainties as the potential
deferments mentioned above, which serve to chill legitimate attempts to
make use of copyright in even legally noninfringing ways. 187 Trials can be
prohibitively expensive even when the defendant has a strong fair use
claim. This is especially relevant to First Amendment concerns, since
parody or otherwise robust "free speech" or artistic fair uses are more likely
to be patrolled against and challenged by holders of this class of copyright
as threatening a lucrative brand or franchise.
181. See LESSIG, supra note 20, at 51; Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1498.
182. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 185-86.
183. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
184. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1487.
185. See id. at 1487-88.
186. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 185, 198 (noting that Google could "potentially be liable
for a minimum of $1.5 billion in statutory damages and a maximum of $300 billion"
(footnote omitted)).
187. For a more complete discussion, see Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2.
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The competing arguments over length of protection reach the core
economic questions of copyright: How do we use copyright to achieve the
optimal level of use of creative works in society? Are economic incentives
to disseminate copyrighted works more important than the benefits of gratis
public access in spurring the creation of the "correct" number of new and
widely available works? At what point do making those economic benefits
greater serve to starve the public domain and rob new creators of the raw
materials they need?
The Copyright Clause was drafted at a time when there was copyright
protection, where the public domain was all encompassing, and where
economic incentives to create and disseminate works were minimal. At
what point does the modem landscape, where the tables are turned, begin to
discourage creation? Who is best equipped to determine where that point
lies, and how can they prevent overprotection? Scholars and lawmakers
have been unable to fashion answers that satisfy both Copyright Warriors
and IP Restrictors. Perhaps better solutions can be found in answers that
scholars in other fields have given to similar questions.
E. Givings: A View of the Cathedralfor Which You'll Have to Pay
a Small Charge
The Eldred debate over government-granted copyright deferments can be
characterized as a debate over the proper balance between public and
private interests. This debate has not been analyzed using the doctrine of
givings, which is a method to balance competing public and private
interests in property law. 188 The Takings Clause, from which the doctrine
of givings is derived, has been providing a market-based guide for
determining the optimal balance between protection of property interests
and efficient governmental use of land since the framing. 189 However, only
recently have a larger number of scholars understood givings to be a
necessary component of that balance.190
First outlined by Henry George in 1879 and discussed by Donald
Hagman and Dea Misczynski in 1978, the idea of givings, unlike its
constitutionally mandated sibling, was largely ignored until Abraham Bell
and Gideon Parchomovsky's article, Givings.191 The latter article outlined
188. In 1998, Professor Richard A. Epstein discussed the constitutionality of the CTEA in
a givings framework. See Richard A. Epstein, Rule of Law: Congress's Copyright
Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A19. The scope of this Note, however, does not
include any possible constitutional mandate for givings; it focuses on the Eldred debate in
the givings context. As to this approach, the relevant literature only contains one short
mention by Professor John F. Duffy, who said that the idea "seems commendable whether
the giving is in physical property or not." John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism
and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1077, 1094 (2005).
189. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 997, 998-99 (1999). See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 22.
190. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 563.
191. Id. at 549 n.3.
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the need for a givings doctrine, provided a taxonomy of givings, and
sketched out a plan for implementing a givings methodology for
government-granted benefits.192
Bell and Parchomovsky's basic concept is that, just as the government
must pay a landowner for any taking of private property for public uses, the
government must charge a landowner who has been given public property
for her private uses. 193 Although there is no textualist reading of the
Constitution that requires this government action, givings, according to Bell
and Parchomovsky, is a necessary concomitant of takings. 1
94
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 195 is designed to ensure that
the government does not deprive citizens of wealth through its power of
eminent domain, and does not exercise its power without taking the costs to
the individual into account.196 But, measured as relative wealth, that is
exactly what happens to Competitor A when the government gives a benefit
to Competitor B that is denied to A.197 In order to balance the relative harm
done to A, B must pay for the benefit.
Likewise, just as takings is a curb on the political abuse of eminent
domain, ensuring that the government does not single out critics, a givings
charge would discourage the government from dealing in patronage and
favoritism. 198 Finally, the guiding purposes of the Takings Clause, fairness
and efficiency, dictate that government should not force one owner to
shoulder a burden that should be borne by a larger group.199 That principle
leads to the conclusion that the government should not force a larger group
to pay for a benefit given to one owner either.200
192. Id.
193. See id. at 554.
194. Although Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky do not address the topic, the
Supreme Court has long upheld the power of local and state governments to charge special
assessments to landowners who benefit from improvements, see Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908), as well as for the federal government to charge user fees.
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463 n.19 (1978) ("A user-fee rationale may be
invoked whenever the United States is recovering a fair approximation of the cost of benefits
supplied.").
195. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
196. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 552-53 (explaining how diminutions in
wealth trigger takings compensation and the efficiency rationale for the Takings Clause is to
curb the eminent domain power).
197. Id. at 552.
198. Id. at 553, 578.
199. For a discussion of takings jurisprudence regarding trade secret data (which is a form
of intellectual property), see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-05 (1984).
The Court looked at the assignability of the data, ability of the data to serve as the res for a
court proceeding, and "reasonable investment-backed expectations." Id. at 1005.
200. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 554.
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1. Three Types of Givings (and Takings)
As sketched above, Bell and Parchomovsky tie the doctrine of givings
tightly to that of takings. 20 1 Where much of the literature and modem case
law describes two kinds of takings, however, Bell and Parchomovsky posit
three. 202 The conceptual closeness begins with three types of givings
analogous to these three types of taking.203  Physical takings are the
familiar eminent domain powers of taking real property. Regulatory
takings, as in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, involve regulation
that "goes too far" in diminishing value or ownership privileges. 204 The
third type of taking they outline is the "derivative taking," where one of the
first two types of takings has an indirect affect on nearby landowners (often
the "not in my backyard" rationale of declining property values).205
Givings follow the same three models.
As an example, imagine that Dagobah Township decides to drain a
swamp on the edge of a productive farm, at great public expense. The
farmer would be the owner of extra arable acreage, a physical giving.
Because the fragile ecosystem has been removed, he and the owners of
contiguous property no longer have to comply with development
restrictions for areas near wetlands. This would constitute a regulatory
giving equal to the subsequently increased value of the farms or lots.
Furthermore, the residential areas surrounding the farm and its immediate
neighbors no longer have to suffer the odors or mosquitoes associated with
the swamp area. That would be a derivative giving, even in the absence of
a physical transfer of property or a lifting of regulations. 20 6
These three types of actions, if they were takings, would trigger a fair
market reimbursement from the government. According to Bell and
Parchomovsky, the matching types of givings likewise should trigger
charges for government largess bestowed upon landowners.
2. When the Doctrine Applies
Just as governmental takings (like taxes) do not always trigger a
reimbursement,20 7 not every giving (such as a National Science Foundation
Award or unemployment benefits) rises to the level where a charge is
required.208 Often the bestowing of a free benefit is precisely the point of
the government's action and a charge would render it meaningless. Beyond
those situations, four indicators help show whether a charge is likely to be
201. Id. at 563.
202. Id. at 558-59.
203. Id. at 558.
204. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
205. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 559.
206. For an extended example of how zoning rights affect the city of Bespin, see id. at
559. This Note in no way advocates the draining of wetlands.
207. Id. at 590; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
208. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 554.
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practicable: the reversibility of the governmental action, the number of
recipients of the benefit, the relationship of the giving to a taking, and the
voluntariness of the benefit.20
9
Reversibility means that when a giving, if it were inverted, would be a
compensable taking, that giving is properly chargeable. 2 10 If the farmer
from the example above had dry, productive land that the government
flooded to build a community reservoir, this physical taking would require
payment. If Mr. Lucas, a neighbor of our Dagobah Lake who had full
development rights on his property, was prevented from building by new
environmental restrictions enacted to protect the reservoir, he would be
subject to a government payment for a regulatory taking. However, the
more distant neighbors, who might be impacted by a return of the
mosquitoes, would not have suffered a compensable giving.
The number of recipients must be manageable and clearly delineated.
Distant neighbors of the drained swamp in the example above would be less
likely than the farmer and the immediate neighbors to be awarded a givings
charge based on the diffuse nature of the benefit. 2 11 Just as a taking from a
large demographic does not typically require recompense, 2 12 a giving to a
large segment of society need not be charged to the members of that
segment.
Another key element in Bell and Parchomovsky's conception of givings
charges is that chargeable givings are very likely to accompany takings
from (usually) another private citizen. The most egregious types of givings
usually are associated with a taking from other private individuals as part of
the same series of transactions. In these situations, the givings charge can
be paid directly from the beneficiary to the victim of the government action,
with little governmental action, except for oversight and enforcement. 2
13
Lastly, in order to be a chargeable giving, the benefit must be refusable if
a landowner doesn't want the benefit or can't afford the charge. This limits
the potential for abuse and the temptation to use the power as a
redistributive mechanism, rather than a leveling regime. 2 14
These signals for when a giving is chargeable are also limitations on the
overuse of givings charges. They help not only to draw a line beyond
which a givings charge would be absurd or unnecessary, but also show how
the government already takes similar situations along a spectrum of
governmental impact into account in takings jurisprudence. 2 15
209. Id. at 590-91. Like takings, there can be no bright-line rule for when a giving has
taken place and when it has not. Id. at 560, 562.
210. Id. at 591.
211. Id. at 593.
212. Id. at 555.
213. Id. at 568 (describing Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)).
214. Bell & Parchomovosky, supra note 22, at 556.
215. See id. at 595-96 (explaining that givings to large groups are not likely to be the
result of special interest politics); see also id. at 551-52 n. 16 (explaining that the limitations
on takings can be seen as an implicit limitation on givings).
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3. Givings and Takings as Optimizing Tools
In all three types of givings, as in takings, the requirement that the
beneficiary pay for the benefit stops too much value from changing
hands.216 In takings, cases like Lucas emphasize the function of curbing
governmental abuses of regulatory power by forcing the government
entities involved to internalize the cost of depriving property owners of the
right to use their property. 217  Likewise, givings forces the potential
beneficiaries of public largess to internalize a cost equivalent to the value of
the benefit.
Therefore, in at least some cases like Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit218 and Kelo v. City of New London,219 factory owners or
developers who would otherwise benefit from the below-market or free
acquisition of publicly controlled property would tend to seek the benefit
less often if it were no longer free or severely undervalued. This would
curb abuses cataloged by public choice scholars, perhaps in a more
significant way than takings alone can do. 220
By using the market valuation of what the property in question is worth
and the private actors' own valuation of what it is worth to them, givings
and takings allow for government redistribution of property when it is most
efficient to do so. Properly reimbursed takings meet the textual
requirements of the Just Compensation Clause. Any proposed givings
regime would not have such a high bar to reach as mandated by the text of
the Constitution. But, the fact that it could meet such a bar is both elegantly
symmetrical and comforting as a constitutionally derived curb against
wasteful promotion of special interests.
II. WARRIORS, RESTRICTORS, AND REBALANCING ACTS: COMPETING
APPROACHES FOR THE "NEXT" COPYRIGHT DEFERMENT
The Supreme Court's ruling in Eldred did little to quiet the controversy
surrounding the CTEA. In addition to Professor Lessig's subsequent
lawsuits,22' vigorous advocacy in the press, academia, and the blogosphere
continued unabated after Eldred.222
216. Id. at 595-96.
217. Id. at 573, 580.
218. 304 N.W.2d 455.
219. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
220. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 587-88.
221. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007); Kahle v. Gonzales, 474
F.3d 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2007).
222. See, e.g., Symposium, Mickey Mice?, supra note 99, at 780, 784 (statements of
Professor Moglen, calling Sonny Bono a "moron [who] skied into a tree," marking
Steamboat Willie as "the moment at which the thugs take over culture in the United States,"
and referring to copyright lawyers as "hirelings of the thugs in Hollywood"). The
symposium was held after the oral arguments, but before the ruling in Eldred. It nonetheless
provides a snapshot of arguments for and against the CTEA that continued long afterwards.
See also Manes, supra note 52 (calling Professor Lessig "an intellectual bully" with
"radically silly ideas"); The Secret Diary of Steve Jobs,
[Vol. 77
2008] GIVINGS AND THE NEXT COPYRIGHT DEFERMENT 839
Possible revisions or challenges to the CTEA as it now exists are not part
of the scope of this Note, which does not purport to solve the disagreement
over existing copyright laws. A givings solution is more useful as a
normative method to determine what an optimal term for future deferments
should be, not as a critical reexamination of the existing law. Accordingly,
this Note addresses a theoretical future deferment of copyright expiration.
Inasmuch as the various sides in this debate are speaking the same
language at all, this part considers how they would answer two questions:
(1) What is the best way to determine the proper length of any future public
domain deferrals? (2) Who is best situated to apply that measure? The
final part of this Note then looks at how a possible givings solution answers
those same questions and addresses the mutual concerns raised by the
competing approaches.
There is disagreement about whether further statutory deferments of
copyright expiration are likely to pass Congress. David 0. Carson, General
Counsel of the U.S. Copyright Office, asserted that he "would be shocked if
Congress in our lifetimes ever extended copyright term again, and [sees] no
evidence for anyone to believe that that is on anyone's agenda." 223
However, Professor Eben Moglen, founder of the Software Freedom Law
Center argues,
[O]f course they will be back. They have no more intention of giving
away Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck or any of the rest of the franchise in
2024 than they had of giving it away in 2004.... They will be back in
twenty years to buy more legislation, if we allow bought legislation in the
United States in twenty years and if they exist.224
Assuming the inevitability of a future debate on the subject when the
CTEA expires, this Note examines what positions the debaters are likely to
take, in order to explore how a givings-based solution would satisfy
concerns on all sides. Part II.A considers the likely position of the IP
Restrictor/Free Culture movement; Part II.B considers the likely position of
the Eldred majority, originalist constitutional scholars, and Congress; and
Part II.C presents several recent ideas that embrace limited market solutions
to questions posed above.
http://fakesteve.blogspot.com/2007/02/one-thing-joumal-almost-got-right-24.html (Feb. 24,
2007, 10:37 EST) (an anonymous Steve Jobs parody site unparodically describing "anti-
copyright free-everything law professor types" as "anti-business loonies" and "anti-corporate
radicals" who are possibly even "cynical[ly] shak[ing] down big companies and lin[ing] their
own pockets, while wrapping themselves in some flag of do-gooderism and spouting lots of
horse shit about protecting consumers and defending freedom"). For an explanation of the
parodic Steve Jobs diary, its popularity, and its well-placed readership, see Brad Stone, A
Mystery Solved: 'Fake Steve'Is an Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,2002, at Cl.
223. Symposium, Mickey Mice?, supra note 99, at 812.
224. Id. at 822-23; see also Jeffery Rosen, Roberts v. The Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2005, at 50 (quoting Lawrence Lessig's speculation that Congress might enact another
deferment in 2019 and that only a broad political coalition can persuade the Court to block
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A. Draw the Line
The IP Restrictor/Free Culture movement answers the first question of
how to determine the optimal amount of public domain deferment in one of
two ways. The first answer is some version of "It's predetermined-none
at all." Lessig and others have often repeated the mantra that the CTEA
was "perpetual copyright on the installment plan." 225 Professor Lessig's
post-Eldred proposal, in the "Eric Eldred Act," was to reduce (not extend)
the term of copyright to a flat seventy years, with re-registration
requirements every five years. 226 However, the answer that the Eldred
legal team gave during the trial and appeals is more nuanced: they
stipulated that the deferral in the CTEA was appropriate for future works,
but it was subject to constitutional outer limits and the Founders' suspicion
of copyright in general. 227 Thus, this alternate answer to the question is a
strict version of, "The term should be as long as necessary to give
incentives to create, but no longer."228
The movement's answer to the second question of who should apply the
properly measured deferment (or advancement) is that Congress should
have the power to legislate in this field, but it should be subject to close
oversight by the Court, which must apply a narrow interpretation of the
"limited Times" and "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"
provisions of the Copyright Clause. 229 However, it is fair to say that the
adage of "strict in theory, fatal in fact" is a good description of the kind of
oversight the IP Restrictors wish to see.230 These ideas are in keeping with
the movement's goal of preserving as large of a public domain as possible
by blocking further deferments for aging twentieth-century works.231
B. Move the Chains
According to the Eldred majority, and the originalist constitutional
scholars cited in this Note, and according to Congress (unsurprisingly), the..
225. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1057,
1071 (2001) (quoting Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi). It is
worth noting that such plans have been advanced by individual congresspersons, industry,
and creators. See, e.g., 144 CONG REC. H9952 (Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono)
("Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that
such a change would violate the Constitution."); id. (referencing "Jack Valenti's proposal for
[a copyright] term to last forever less 1 day"); Helpem, supra note 16 ("The genius of the
framers in making this provision is that it allows for infinite adjustment. Congress is free to
extend at will the term of copyright. It last did so in 1998, and should do so again, as far as
it can throw.").
226. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 292. Other movement scholars, notably, Professor
Moglen, have stated that all copyright should be abolished. Symposium, Mickey Mice?,
supra note 99, at 824.
227. These limitations did not allow the deferment for existing works. See supra Part I.C.
228. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 292.
229. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
230. Fullilove v. Klitznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
231. See supra Part I.D.1.
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answer to the question of how to determine the optimal amount of public
domain deferment is "By leaving the decision up to the branch of
government most prepared to react to societal changes as envisioned in the
Constitution." 232 The answer to the second question is, of course, implicit
in the first: Congress may legislate freely, subject to the same level of
Supreme Court oversight as other areas of economic policy. The IP
Restrictors refer to the copyright extensions that have been the result of this
system as "perpetual copyright on the installment plan," 233 otherwise
known as "moving the goalposts." However, rather than moving the
goalposts, or changing the rules of the game when one's favored team is in
danger of losing, proponents of these answers might prefer to use another
football metaphor and liken this to "moving the chains. '234 The proponents
of Congress's power stress the ability of each Congress to periodically
measure how the copyright laws are affecting the country, and to decide
whether it is appropriate to leave copyrights in the hands of the
rightsholders.2 35
The Court used the textualist version of "limited Times" to assert that
any deferment period with an end date was a limited time in accordance
with the Constitution.236  Extending this conception of the Copyright
Clause, Professor Schwartz and Dean Treanor argue that, as long as any
particular Congress makes the decision to defer copyright expiration, the
Copyright Clause is satisfied.237 It is only when a present Congress binds a
future Congress to unlimited terms that the "limited Times" language is
truly violated.238 The requirement for each Congress to enact the law
separately, then, is enough of a limit on excesses that might, if unchecked,
hamper the creation and optimal use of works. 239
Professor Landes and Judge Posner take this reading of "limited Times" a
step further with their proposal for "infinitely renewable copyright. '240
They argue that the "limited Times" requirement could be circumvented by
allowing repeated extensions of the copyright term.241 While this proposal
looks the most like "perpetual copyright on the installment plan," Landes
232. See supra Part I.D.2.
233. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 215-16 (quoting Peter Jaszi).
234. In football, "moving the chains," refers to the referee's 10-yard indicators, connected
by chains, which are used to determine if the offense has advanced the ball that distance and
thus retains possession. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2008 NCAA FOOTBALL
RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS, rule 1.2, art. 7, at FR-25 to FR-26 (2008), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.comIUploads/PDF/Football-Rulesadc982b5-03fb-4e27-828c-c
2d26b95e6cl.pdf; see also CHARLES P. PIERCE, MOVING THE CHAINS: TOM BRADY AND THE
PURSUIT OF EVERYTHING 9 (2007).
235. Brief for the Respondent at 28, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618).
236. See supra Part I.C.
237. Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2386.
238. Id.
239. See supra Part I.C.
240. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 29.
241. Id. at 472.
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and Posner argue that allowing for short deferment periods, subject to a fee,
"may enable society to have its cake and eat it too" by enlarging the public
domain while protecting valuable copyrights. 242
C. Rebalancing Acts
There have been several recent ideas that use limited market approaches
to answer both questions posed above. How do you determine how much
deferment is optimal? According to proponents of these methods, we
should let controlled market forces come to bear. Who has the power to
make the determination? In these indirect plans-registration fees, usage
taxes, and fair use harbors-Congress would establish statutory
mechanisms that would present users or rightsholders with a monetary
choice.
1. Registration Fees and Hurdles
The orphaned works problem, according to Lessig, is made worse by the
lack of formal renewal requirements. Writing in the New York Times,
Professor Lessig has called for essentially a reimplementation of the
renewal requirement, in the form of a flat renewal fee of fifty dollars.243
While this is not a complete solution, Lessig argues that some of the worst
examples of needlessly keeping works from the public domain will be
lessened. Copyright Office General Council David 0. Carson admitted,
"[p]ersonally-and I hasten to add that this isn't the Copyright Office's
view-I look back wistfully at the terms of the 1909 Act in a number of
respects, including.., some of the formalities." 244
Notably, the European Union's proposed 2008 copyright deferment
directive contains a provision extending copyright only to works made
available to the public within one year of the term extension. 245 While not
a cash fee, this "use it or lose it" clause is intended to ameliorate the
orphaned works problem. 246
However, these types of proposals have been criticized as unworkable,
since Berne prevents a country from imposing any registration requirements
on citizens of other member countries. 247
242. Id. at 518.
243. Lessig, supra note 54; see also Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on
Copyright Reform Project, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 551, 566 (supporting "periodic renewals of
copyright claims for a small registration fee").
244. Symposium, Mickey Mice?, supra note 99, at 827.
245. See European Proposal, supra note 19, at 13.
246. Id.
247. Michael Botein & Edward Samuels, Compulsory Licensing v. Private Negotiation in
Peer-to-peer File Sharing, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2007, at 1, 21; Katherine Kelly, For of All
Sad Words of Tongue or Pen, the Saddest Are "It Might Have Been," 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 793, 803--04 (2005).
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2. Use Tax/Bundled Licenses
Professor William Fisher has proposed that copyright be replaced by a
general tax paired with "digital watermarks" on all media capable of digital
use, that is distributed to creators and rightsholders based on downloads. 248
According to Professor Lessig, "Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing
the system to lapse." 249  While Fisher sees this as a replacement for
copyright, Lessig reconceptualizes the idea as a temporary complement to
his proposals about shorter terms and registration requirements. 250 A
similar idea, the "Comes With Music" plan, from mobile phone maker
Nokia and Universal Music, would add a surcharge to the price of a music
download-enabled phone, which would purchase an unlimited download
license for one year. The license could be purchased separately after one
year.251
3. Fair Use Harbors
Professor Parchomovsky has proposed a series of bright-line rules for fair
use in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with waiting to be sued for
infringement and invoking a fair use defense. 252 These rules include ten
seconds of musical works, thirty frames of film, 300 words of text, etc. A
more robust, or at least, more certain fair use doctrine would optimize the
use of copyrightable works by removing the risk from what are currently
legal, but underutilized methods of noninfringing use. While not impacting
public domain deferment directly, it can provide a bulwark against too
much copyright protection from Congress by using statutory means to
enable market users to reduce uncertainty when making fair use of
copyrighted works. 253 A related proposal has been made by Professor
Pamela Samuelson, who advocates substantially expanding the concept of
fair use into "clusters" including free speech promotion, authorship
promotion, market failure correction, and personal uses. 254
248. William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities, http://www.law.harvard.
edu/faculty/tfisher/Music.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
249. LESSIG, supra note 22, at 301.
250. Id. at 301-02; see also supra Parts ILA, II.C. 1.
251. Posting of Saul Hansell to Bits Blog, Nokia and Universal's Proposed Music Tax,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/nokia-and-universals-proposed-music-tax/ (Dec. 4,
2007, 16:05 EST).
252. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1488-89.
253. In fact, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg cited the fair use exception and idea/expression
dichotomy as reasons why First Amendment rights were not implicated by the CTEA. Eldred
v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
254. Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law, 2008
Robert L. Levine Lecture at Fordham University School of Law: Unbundling Fair Use (Apr.
30, 2008) (lecture handout on file with author).
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III. GIVINGS
This part recommends moving a step beyond the limited market
adjustments of the indirect proposals outlined in Part II.C in favor of a more
robust market solution. The givings model would use financial pressures
on copyright holders to ensure that future deferments balance the goals of
protecting creativity and promoting optimal use of creative works. The
givings model has the advantage of fairness and utility, elimination of
orphaned works and public choice problems. While this Note does not
attempt to place givings within originalist or textualist readings of the
Constitution as positive law, the normative solution of givings is compatible
with constitutional aims. Finally, the scrutiny given by each copyright
holder, who decides whether to pay a givings charge for a deferment, can
serve as a proxy for the heightened scrutiny sought by invocation of the
First Amendment or the preamble of the Copyright Clause.
A. Answering the Questions: The Complementary Market Underpinnings
of Givings and Copyright
A givings solution answers the questions raised in Part II by allowing a
robust market mechanism to set the optimal amount of copyright expiration
deferments on a case-by-case basis. Congress would draw the exact
outlines of the system in setting up the market. Individual determinations
about the length of copyright would instead be made by individual
decisions of each rightsholder, informed by (and perhaps pressured by)
market forces.
The doctrine of givings, applied to copyright expiration deferments,
introduces market forces more directly into an area that has always been
indirectly influenced by economic forces. As mentioned above, Justices
Ginsburg and O'Connor, and Professor Landes and Judge Posner have
characterized copyright doctrine as applied law and economics. 255
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, copyright law has
responded to new technologies in order to spur creative innovation in
copyrightable works and in the technology used to manufacture and copy
the works.256 This economic understanding of the balance sought by the
Copyright Clause can be more fully realized by a givings regime.
In order to spur creative output to benefit the public, copyright creates a
profit incentive for "authors" by granting them exclusive rights. 257 But,
when those rights become too great, even though the incentive is more
powerful, the actual aims of the incentive, the dissemination of the works to
the public, becomes lessened at a rate greater than the creation thus
spurred.258
255. See supra notes 23, 127 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., supra notes 37-38.
257. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 121-26.
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Currently, there is no economic incentive to let works enter the public
domain, because retaining copyright is costless while potential rewards
from licensing or statutory damages can be high. A givings charge strikes a
balance between too much and too little incentive by forcing the
rightsholder to decide whether the copyright is still productive enough for a
market-rate monetary investment. By assigning a cost for deferment, more
works will enter the public domain, both for the use of the public and future
creators.
According to Professor Landes and Judge Posner, copyright creates an
artificial market to value creative works that would otherwise be
undervalued so much as to prevent their creation.259 Givings uses that same
artificial market to approximate the value that an individual work would
have as part of the public domain, and therefore to put a price on
deferments from the public domain on a case-by-case basis.
Since the value of an individual work to the public domain (and the value
of the public domain to the public) is difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain, givings uses the market value that the potential public domain
deferments would have in the rightsholder's hands as a proxy. A
rightsholder's decision of whether to pay that price takes the place of
society's balancing public domain value against the value of the economic
incentive to the rightsholders. This replacement of a rightsholder's
financial decision, informed and affected by the market value of the work,
is a sort of strict market scrutiny that will have the effect of limiting
deferments without implicating the Constitution.
Works like Steamboat Willie and Mickey Mouse likely would be
deferred from the public domain yet again, as they would have some value
to their copyright holders beyond their raw market valuation.260
Realistically, however, those high-value works inevitably will be deferred
under almost any post-Eldred scenario. 26 1 However, they will not drag the
rest of the creative realm away from the public domain in a givings regime.
These copyrights currently distort the legislative playing field, but under
givings, the revenues they generate can help fund the entire system.
B. Testing Copyright Deferments as Givings
In order to analyze whether a givings regime would prove useful in
copyright term balancing, the threshold question is the same for any givings
analysis: Is the deferment of copyright expiration a chargeable giving? The
same four factors for givings analysis in a property law context provide the
answer to that question.
259. See supra Part I.D.4.
260. Licensing is only one possible way of valuation of copyright. The actual methods
used to determine market rate for givings charges is beyond the scope of this Note.
261. Disney made $4.5 billion in retail revenue from Mickey Mouse in 2003. Green,
supra note 53. This is a powerful incentive for Disney to continue to push legislation to
preserve it's copyright. However, no other character comes close to this sort of revenue. Id.
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First, if the act were reversed, would there be a taking? If we can
imagine, like the proponents of the Eldred Act or Professor Moglen (but
unlike Justice Stevens) 262 a congressional act that shortens the term of
copyright protection, the answer is yes. Rights-holding industries would
almost certainly view any curtailing of the copyright term as a regulatory
taking, and demand Fifth Amendment just compensation.2 63
Second, are the beneficiaries of the supposed giving identifiable? In this
case, as Landes and Posner point out, the longer the term of copyright, the
harder it is to trace heirs and assignees. 264 This is the cause of the orphaned
works problem. However, a return of a registration system is a necessary
component of a givings model, and it addresses this hurdle.265
Third, can the giving of a copyright deferment be clearly associated with
a taking? Yes, according to Professor Lessig and Henry Smith, copyright is
a taking from the public domain.266
Fourth, is the benefit refusable? Under the CTEA and 1976 Acts,
deferments are automatic, but it is possible to refuse the deferment-though
this was rarely done. 267 A registration system, if re-established, would
make this an opt-in, rather than an opt-out, regime and refusals would be
more common. 268 Because the answers to each of these questions is yes,
either as copyright doctrine currently stands, or given certain governmental
structures that would be necessary for a givings system to work (like a
registration system), following the Bell and Parchomovsky model,
copyright expiration deferment would qualify as a giving.
C. Creating a Working Givings Framework for Expiration Deferments
The basic, givings-based solution would be easiest to apply to some
future CTEA or URAA rather than to existing law. This future deferment
would be paired with the introduction of a market-rate givings charge.
Whatever "limited Time[]" that Congress chose to offer to rightsholders
would come with a charge designed to recapture the total value of the
benefit to the company during that time frame.
Following Bell and Parchomovsky's givings methodology, the givings
charge could either go directly to the owners affected by the related taking,
or to the government. In the case of copyright expiration deferments,
keeping information out of that common ownership of the public domain is
a taking from the people; the property right is held in public trust by the
262. See supra note 99.
263. See supra Part I.D.3.
264. Posner& Landes, supra note 23, at 361.
265. Involuntary or unknown copyrights will be swept away with the enactment of a
minimum givings charge system. Deferments will only be granted when the charge is paid
and records of this payment must necessarily be kept by the government. Works whose
copyright has outlived economic usefulness will likely be given up to the public domain.
266. LESSIG, supra note 20, at 25; Smith, supra note 122, at 1766-69.
267. See supra note 129.
268. See generally Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2007).
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government. 269 Rather than facilitate a monetary transfer to the public, the
givings doctrine would work best by charging the rightsholders a fee, which
would go to the government. 270
Therefore, the money that entered the public fisc could be used to
administer the valuation of copyright givings charges and the payment
records that would serve as registration with the excess paid into a fund to
promote, preserve, and protect the public domain. Thus, the money would
serve the same interests of the public that are affected by the givings to
private rightsholders.
Assessments in the case of deferrals would be calculated in much the
same way that property assessments are carried out now. Assessors, who
could become part of the Copyright Office, could look to comparable
intellectual property rights, expected revenue streams, past performance, or
potential alternative uses to come up with the market valuation. While, in a
perfect theoretical version of the methodology, the goal would be a total
benefits recapture, the actual charge in relation to the assessed value would
be an administrative decision of the assessment office. Individual charges
doubtlessly would often be contested ex post, but an appeals process similar
to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction would be appropriate and sustainable
considering the high value of additional copyright deferments, with a
supplementary register of copyright protecting the works until a final
determination could be reached and charges paid.
This system, like any market-based solution, could lead to imperfect
markets replacing the arbitrary statutory rules; however, many problems
could be anticipated and avoided. The problem of rightsholders who make
bad projections and overpay for deferments that they cannot properly
exploit could become a problem analogous to the heirs of creators who
currently have incentives not to release relatively valueless works to the
public domain, but to wait for a windfall in the form of statutory damages
from potential infringers, or to hope for renewed interest in the work. In
order to avoid this situation, a partial refund for waiver of rights could be
instituted for rightsholders to cash out of the system if they make the wrong
"bets." This refund option would have to be a small enough percentage of
the original cost not to function as de facto "bad decision insurance" and
therefore encourage overdeferral, but large enough to encourage
unproductive works to be returned to the public domain.
D. Shortcomings ofAlternative Proposals
The proposals discussed in Part II provide unacceptable or incomplete
alternatives to the givings-based solution. The visions offered by the IP
Restrictors and Copyright Warriors invite us to revisit the quandary of
269. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing a taking of privately owned
property in Poletown).
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Shakespeare's clown in Merchant of Venice. 271 Both sides counsel well
and are mutually exclusive. The IP Restrictors' vision, as Schwartz and
Treanor point out, places the Court as arbiter over the details of
congressional economic legislation in a way reminiscent of Lochner.272
However, the "move the chains" scenario preferred by the Copyright
Warriors, if repeated by future copyright deferments, will necessarily result
in the foretold impoverishment of the public domain. 273
The infinitely renewable copyright proposed by Landes and Posner274 fits
the description of what the Eldred Court called "effectively perpetual
copyrights" created to "evade the 'limited Times' constraint. '275 As such,
it is not likely to pass constitutional muster. A less extreme version of this
plan where renewals are limited, mentioned in passing by Landes and
Posner, 276 comes closer to the benefits of givings, although the article does
not mention market pricing as a limit on copyright terms.
Lastly, the hybrid market-based approaches outlined in Part II.C,
although they address the worst of the current orphaned works and fair use
problems, are not as comprehensive as a givings-based framework, and may
present problems with treaty commitments. The use tax, proposed by
Professor Fisher, even assuming that its technical viability and privacy
implications are not concerns, effectively uses the marketplace to allocate
per-use compensation to rightsholders and ignores the market in assessing
charges, penalizing all taxpayers equally.
E. Addressing Potential Objections to Givings
Although current rightsholders may argue that total benefits capture
removes profit incentives to opt into the system, this is a question of where
one draws the line. It is also important to remember that these deferments
would come only in a context of expiring copyrights. The alternative to
opting in would be losing all exclusive rights, so any money they can make
from a deferral of the public domain transfer is an unearned gift.277 The
expectation inherent in the charge system is that unless the rightsholder has
a new method of exploiting the work that cannot be accounted for in a
backwards-looking market valuation, there is no governmental interest in
271. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 14.
272. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.B.
274. William M. Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner analyzed the proposal on an
economic basis, not a legal one. See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 473.
275. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003).
276. See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 518.
277. Rightsholders who would argue that, instead of being an unearned gift, copyright
deferment is a right and a givings charge is instead a tax or a taking, are begging the question
of perpetual copyright and proving the need for givings charges to ameliorate the tension
between rational basis review and the "limited Times" phrasing of the Constitution.
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deferring the expiration. 278  This fits with constitutional goal of
encouraging innovation, rather than protecting the natural rights of
creators.279 Furthermore, because public value tends to go up over time,
simiply allowing status quo exclusive uses to continue doesn't keep pace
with the added value to the public.
Another potential objection is that many holders of valuable copyrights
might not be able or willing to pay a charge before being allowed to resume
economically exploiting the work. To ameliorate that problem, Bell and
Parchomovsky have proposed an option to delay the collection of charges in
some cases until the new benefit has been exploited.2 80 Within the
copyright context, this would take the form of an amortized charge over the
term of the extension.
Originalists are not likely to find a givings discussion in the ratification
debates or in the words of Publius. To a very large extent, the
disagreements between the historical interpretation of Breyer and that of
Treanor are irrelevant to this discussion because the doctrine of givings is
not described in the Constitution, nor does it claim to be so. Instead, the
givings proposal is a normative one-to show what the law should be, not
what it already is. However, givings, if not a true part of original
understanding, is at least compatible with it.2 81
The public choice objections offered by Lessig, the Eldred amici, and
other scholars are addressed by a givings solution as well. Charging for any
copyright deferment will lessen the preference problem of legislators who
would rather preserve their own terms in office by pleasing large potential
donors. To be sure, there will be disputes over the size of the charge and
valuation of the benefit, much like in takings jurisprudence. These,
however, can be centered in administrative and court systems and insulated
from the political process, much like trademark appeals today.282
A givings charge allows a rightsholder to extend the time during which
third parties may not use the work as free expression without privately
contracting for it. While this might seem to run counter to the aims of the
CTEA opponents, it does, however, satisfy what may be the basic goal of
the movement's First Amendment argument. By invoking the First
Amendment, the proponents of such a measure want to invoke a higher
level of scrutiny as to the wisdom of withholding copyrighted materials
from the public domain. A givings regime provides that higher level of
scrutiny, albeit from the combination of market valuations and the
individual decisions of rightsholders as rational actors, instead of judges.
278. Commentators within Disney and the licensing industry, for example, thought that
the Mickey Mouse character potentially could earn from $1 billion to $1.8 billion more per
year as of 2004. Green, supra note 53.
279. See supra note 44.
280. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 22, at 566-67.
281. See supra Part I.E.3 (describing the connections between givings and Takings
Clause jurisprudence).
282. The trademark registration and appeals process is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1053-
1071 (2006).
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Nonetheless, a givings regime encourages much more public domain work,
while holding back only those works where effective channels of
distribution and ready markets indicate that they may be best disseminated
to the public by a rightsholder.
Finally, the givings methodology is a market system to determine the
optimal level of copyright protection versus public domain access for each
individual deferment. It cannot provide the larger philosophical
background answers as to what the optimal levels of protection and free
dissemination are, nor does it purport to. Whatever political and legal
decisions are made by Congress and the courts, the givings charge and
assessment system can be adjusted to match whatever the optimal level is.
CONCLUSION
A givings solution, applied to copyright expiration deferment, would be
likely to displease many on both sides of the debate: businesses that would
see a givings charge as a tax on continued use of a current asset, and
anticopyright activists who would see a method for large corporations to
simply buy their way out of the public domain. But, the givings doctrine
can also provide a wide middle ground from which many concerns of both
groups can be met. A givings regime could use market forces to promote
the constitutional goals of production of new creativity and the widest
availability of creative works, while simultaneously strengthening both the
public domain and industry. It can provide a restraint on the tendency of
Congress to please donors by repeatedly widening the scope and
lengthening the term of copyright while also conforming to the modem
conception of the Court's limited role in overseeing economic legislation.
Finally, as a market-based solution, it takes economic realities into account
while promoting efficient use of intellectual property.
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